630
FEDEBALBEl'ORTEB,
vol. 48.
In re j :;, ,
CHASE
et al. '
(otreuit Oourt. D. Ma88achlltBef;t$. January 11,1892.)
ev_rPMB PlJTIES-CLASSIFIOA.TION-CoMMON ...Tarift Act tS\lO,
.i .. ;' '.
,
K, par. 877, class 2, imposes a duty of 12 cents per pound On Cotswold; Lincolnshire, down combintwools, Canada long wools, or otller like combing wools q! English .bloo.d;. * * and also hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, and other like animals... 'Beta that, In view of the fact that in formllr act&this . has. beell .construed· to.llmbrsCll only combing wools, common goat hair is not included ill. it, tlut blliongs in paragraph 604 of the free-list, which covers "hair of horses, cattle, and other animals * * * not spllcially provided tor ill this act. ..
GOAT HAm·
At Law., Petition by L. C. Chase & Co. for a review of the decision of the board of general apprllisers as to the classification of common goat hair. Reversed. JosiahP. for petitioners. Henry 4 .. Wyman, Asst. {I. S. Atty.
CoLT,' J·., The. subject ·ofimportation in this case was common. goat hair, uponw'hich the collector assessed a duty of 12 cents per pound, under :paragraph 377, Schedule K, of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, which is as follows: "Class two. that is to say Leillester, Cotswold, Linllolnshire, down combCalladll long wools', pr 6ther.llkecombing wools of English Mood, and usually knqwn by herein used, and also, hail of the camel, goat, alpaca, aud other like animals." The pr9tested against this asse!lsment, and claimed the merchapdise in que$tion came under paragraph 604 of the freelist, which provides as Jollows: .. Hair of horlJea. cattle, and otber animals · · · not specially provided .' . ' for in this act. If The board of general appraisers affirmed the decision of the collector, and the petitioners now al'lk the court to review this question, as providEd by section 15 ofthe,.:act of 1, 1890. .The grounds upon which the board based their decision are set forth in the prior case of Oentral Vt. R. 00. v. Collector oj Burlington, (G. A. 280,) where the same question arose. H must be admitted that the question here presented is not free from difficulty. Paragraph 377 of Schedule K of the tariff act of 1,890, U11der which this importation was classified by the collector, relates to what is known as the II combing-wool" class, embracing those kinds of wool which are fit for combing; the closing part of the paragraph, however, has reference to hair, anll specifies the" hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, and other like animals." Now, it is admitted that the hair of the camel and, further, that the hair of certain and alpaca are fit for kinds of goat, like the Cashmere and Angora, are adapted for combing purposes. Shall the words, then, II hair of the * * * goat," be taken literaIJy as if they formed a rlistinct paragraph, and so held to cover all
IN HE CHASE.
631
kinds of goat hair,or shall they be construed in oonnection with the paragraph in which they are found, and in the light of the whole context and surroundings, and so limited to combing goat hair? It can scarcely be seriously contended that congress intended by this language to include comrildng()at ,hair unfit for combing purposes, and so to assess a prohibitive duty of 12 cents a pound upon such kinds of goat hair. In dealing with such a difficult, intricate, and ooinplex subject as the tariff, lobrMing, as it does, the enumeration and proper classification of hundreds of different articles of commerce; it is hardly possible that congress! could succeed in every instance in expressing, inexact and uMmbiguotuflanguage, precisely what was intendedj and in the construction ofthe custom laws the supreme court have conformed to what they be;' Heved was the' intent of congress, though such 'construction may have involved" it. change or modification of the exact language of the statute: Hartta/njt v. Meyer, 135U. S.237,:10 Sup; Ot. Rep.751jEUiottv. Swain.. wout, 10 Pet. 137, 152. While the words of a statute are generally to have a controlling effect upon its construction, the interpretation of these words is often to be sought from surrounding circumstances and preceding history. Siemen's Adm'r v. SeUers, 123 U. S. 276, 285, 8 Sup. Ot. Rep. 117. So here, while the taken ordinary sense and apart from thegetletarcontext, should' be construed' Rsit has been by the collector and the board of general appraisers, yet I think that the surrounding circtllllstancas and preceding history Call for a different con" '" " , struction. ,Irdhe tariff act of 1861, and since that time, wools, hair of alpaca, goat, lUili pther like animals have together. The acts of 1861 and 1864 made the rate of duty uponthis class of merchandise depenflerit upon the value per pound;, The act of 1867 adopted a new method and divided these articles into three classes, and this subdivision has continued to the present time and is found in the act of 1890. This pew method is based upon race of blood and fitness or adaptability fottlst'in the arts. -In the acts of 1867 and 1883 there are found three Classes:' "Class 1, clothing wools'j" " class 2 CombinK wools; " and" class 3, carpet wools and other similar wools.'" The act of 1890 retains the same but omits words ic clothing wools," "combing \vools," "caipet wools, and other simUar wools." I do not deem the omission of these words of any importance or significance because the same general classification is retained as in the previous acts. With the exception of the omission of the headinK words "combing wools," the addition of theword" camel," and the transposition of the words !!alpaca" and "goat." the language of paragraph 377 of the present act ia the same as is found in the prior acts of 1867 and 1883. The construction put upon this paragraj)h by the treasury department from 1867 down to 1890, (with the exception of a part of the year 1886,) and by the federal courts, is adverse to the present ruling of the board ofgen ralappraisers, and in harmony with the eontentionof the petitioners. 8yn. Sel'. ,Nos. 4,108,,7,999; contra,' Nos. 7,544, 7,614. rendered in 1886; Y.' B.v. McNeely, where the qliestion was passed upon by'Judge
632
FEDERAL
REI'ORTER, yol. 48.
BunER; 'This case is not reported, but is referred to and accepted as authprityin Syn. Ser. No.7 ,999. ' See, also, Dobson v. Cooper, 46 Fed. Rep.l84. where Judge BUTI,ER again ruled on the same question. I arnnot unmindful of the force of the reasons urged by the board of general appraisers in their opinion, and by the district attorney in his brief,as ,to, thc import of specific language used in paragraph 377, and that grammatically the words" hair of the * * * goat" are not qualifieqby tbe word" comQingj" but, in view of the surrounding context, 0,£ congress, tbe construction given by the federal coqrt.· alld tpetrellsury ,departml'lnt for a long term of years except in the yea.. I feel bound to bold tbat these words were not intended to If this importation is not within parais clear that it comes under paragrapb 604 ofthe free-list. of the bqaJ;d of is reversed, and judgment-sbpuIq be entered for the petitiOners for a return .of the amount of
Paid. '
ButK,
v.
LYON CoUNTY
"al·
Gotirt.N. D. Iowa,W.
FEDERAL PRACTICE-FOLLOWING STATE STATUTE-EQUITY AND LAW CAUSES.
The C()DsUtution of Iowa perpetuates the distinction between law aDd equity ju·. risdiction, but. the state statute provides that, if an error is made in the .formot an action; it shall-not danse an abatement thereof. but the cause shall be transferred to thepro:per(iocket.Held, tllat the circuit court, sitting in Iowa, should follow this practice, and, upon sustaining a demurrer to a bill in equity on the ground tbat' tlle complainant had an adequate remedy at law, would permit the be to 'the law docket, withlElave to amend the pleadings, if necesear;r.
Suit by the United States Ban,k the cpunty of Lyon, Heard on motion to transfer the cause from the equity Motion granted. ' . . . HenderSon, Hurd, Daniels &- Kiesel, for plaintiff. , Van Wa9enen &- McMiUan,Kauffman c!d1'Ue ey, and E. O. Roach, for defendants.' "
At La". Iowa, and to the
rns
SHJRAS, J .',l'his suit is pending upon the equity docket, the bill therein having, been filed:torecover a decree or judgment against the defendants for tile a1Ilount of money paid by the complainant bank in the -purchase of l;lertain bonds-issued by the county of Lyon, but which the county nQw :refqses to pay ,()n the ground that the bonds were issued therefor. Upon demurrer to the bill, this court held tbat the, facts alleged in tbe bill did not· show a case, for equitable. relief, on the ground thllt complainant had an adequate and sufficient remedy at law,:l1nd that the real object sought by complainant was a decree or judgUl:ent for the money advanced in the purchase of tbe bonds.