WITHCOFSKY "'. WIER.
801
if it had been the duty ofthe watchman to get the vessel under way, and navigate her from one anchorage to another, in the same port, he might have sued in admiralty for such services, as they are of a maritime nature. The cases of Phillips v. The Scattergood, Gilp. 3; The Amstel, Bl. & H. 215; Cox v. Murray, 1 Abb. Adm. 341; and The S. G. Owen8,1 Wall. Jr. 370,-have also been cited, and they are of the same general character as Gurney v. Crockett, 8upra. With reference to all of those cases it may be said that the tests therein applied to determine have very whether the contracts involved were maritime, were tests generally been pronounced to be inadmissible and indecisive by later decisions, in some instances, of the same courts in which those decisions were pronounced. Thus, the case of Gurney v. Crockett, decided in 1849, in the Southern district of New York, was overruled, in effect, in the same district, by the case of Roberts v. The Windermere, decided May, 1880, vide 2 Fed. Rep. 722. The other later cases to which reference is made as establishing a more liberal interpretation of the term "maritime contract" are the following: Insurance Co. v.Dunham, 11 Wall. 26; The Goo. T. Kemp, 2 Low. 482; The Onore, 6 Ben. 564; The Erinagh, 7 Fed. Rep. 231; The Senator, 21 Fed. Rep. 191; The Trimountain, 5 Ben. 250; The Hattie M. Bain, 20 Fed. Rep. 289; The Wivanhoe, 26 Fed. Rep. 927. A portion of the libelant's demand in the present case grew out of the performance of a maritime service, even under the narrow rule applied in the case of Gurney v. Crockett, supra, and as the exceptions are general, and are urged against the whole demand, they might properly be overruled for that reason. But I am of the opinion that according to tests now applied to determine what are maritime contracts, the entire demand as described in the libel grew O\1t of a maritime contract, and is within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. The exceptions are accordingly overruled.
WITHCOFSKY v. WIER and another.! (District Court, E. D. New York. September. 8, 1887.) 1. ADMIRALTY-PERSONAL INJURy-STATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The requirement of the New York state law, that an action for a personal injury must be begun within three years from the occurrence of such injury. has no effect to bar a suit in admiralty, begun after that limit. TO SEAMAN-INJURy-LIABILITY.
2. SAME-LASHING SPARli;-WHEEL-RENDERING WHEEL DANGEROUs-No NOTICE
Defendant, master of a vessel, caused the spare-wheel, which in its ordinary condition rested loosely and unfastened upon the drum of the steamwheel, to be lashed so that it would rotate with the drum, thus rendering the apparatus dangerous to one engaged in cleaning it. No notice of the changed condition of the wheel was given to libelant, a seaman, in couse·
1
Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.
302
,FEDERAI" REPORTER.
q,uen, ce of which,while the latter was engaged in his duty of cleaning the apparatus. his hand was caught and so injured as to require amputation. HeW,. that defendant was liable for the injury. ' 8. DAM:AGEs-'-Loss OF fuND-FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS NOT EXCESSIVE.
Where an accident occurred through the negligence of defendant, resulting in the loss of libelant's hand, held, that a judgment for $4,000 was not exces· sive. , ,I·;
THE CANIMA.
(Circuit Court, S.
J).
New York. March 6,1885.) ,
"The steam.·sbip C., coming up North river to make a landing on the $outh sido:o£f,pier 47,caught sight of theca'1al-boat .R. lying qver 500 feet away northside of pier with;her. prqjecting 19 or 19 feet int.o the river beyond the end of the pIer. ThIS pIer dId not extend lDtO th'e stream by over 50 feet. the distance of the other piers, and the place where the R. lay was 250 feeH'othe iiol'th·from intended berthoftIieO. The C. meant
,AT PIlIlR-CANk.BoAT.