848
FEDERAL REPORTER. THE THAMES. (District Court, 8. D. New York. December 23,1881.)
1.
MARITIME LIEN-SERVICES IN PROCURING CHARTER.
A shipping broker has no lien on a vessel, in admiralty, for services in procuring a charter-party.
In Admiral ty. F. A. Wilcox, for libellants, cited 5 Ben. 63, 70, 71; 2 FED. REP. 722; 4 Ben. 864; 8 Chi. Leg. News, 401; 3 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 425; 2 Low. 482; 17 Wall. 666; 1 Dill. 460; 2 Low. 173; 5 Ben. 74, 78. Michael H. Cardozo, for claimant, cited 1 Abb. Adm. 340, 490; Etting, Adm. 69, 74; 2 Olcott, 120; 3 Mason, 6; 3 Sumn. 144. (On general subject of maritime liens, see 21 Am. Law Reg. 1, 82; 16 Am. Law Rev. 193.-[REP.) BROWN, D. J. I am not prepared to assert jurisdiction in admiralty in this case. In the case of The Riga, L. R. 3 Ad. & Eccl. 516, the ultimate determination is not reported, and the question depended wholly upon the statute, (3 & 4 Viet.) In this country such juris. diction has never been asserted. In The Gustavia, Bl. & H. 189, shipping a crew was held like furnishing necessary supplies for a voyage. The distinction between preliminary services leading to a maritime contract and such contracts themselves have been affirmed in this country from the first, and not yet departed from. It furnishes a distinction capable of somewhat easy application. If it be broken down, I do not perceive any other dividing line for excluding from the admiralty many other sorts of claims which have a reference, more or less near or remote, to navigation and commerce. If the broker of a charter-party be admitted, the insurance broker must follow,-the drayman, the expressman, and all others who perform services having reference to a voyage either in contemplation or exe· cuted. In Merchan.t v. Lulan, upon a similar case, the libel was dismissed on execution (as I find on examination) on February 22, 1879, by Benedict, J., in the eastern district, and the same decision must bi made here. Libel dismissed, with costs. See Ferris v. The Bark E. D. Jewett, 2 FED. REP. 111.
HUBBARU V. BELLEW.
849
HUBBARD
v.
BELLEW
and others.
(Oircuit Oourt, W. D. Wi8consin. February 4,1882.) 1. CoNTRACT-CONSTRUCTION.
A written contract was entered into in August, 1875, between B. on one side and certain parties residents of another state, by their attorney, S., on the other side. By the contract, the parties, through their attorney, agree to sell to B. a quantity of timber lands, the price to be determined by an estimate to be 'afterwards made of the amount of pllle timber upon each description of land at $2.50 per acre for the stumpage.. They also agree to sell to B. the pine timber upon certain other lands described, at the rate of *2.50 per thousand feet for stumpage. B., on his part, agreed to build a saw-mill worth $9,000 upon one of the 40-acre tracts, to be selected by him; and the other parties agree to give him title to the 4O-acre tract so selected for the mill site, which B. is to have the privilege of mortgaging to an outside party in the sum of .6,500, and then he is to give a second mortgage back to the vendors to secure the faithful performance of the contract. After the execution and delivery of the contract, B. borrowed from H., the plaintiff in this suit, upon the strength of the contract, about $10,000, to build and complete the contemplated mill. After the mill was built, B. gave to H., the plaintiff herein, a deed intended as a mortgage of the mill and mill site, to secure him for his advances, without the knowledge of S., the agent of the vendors, and before they had made any conveyance of the land to B. Afterwards the vendors brought suit in the state court to enforce a specific performance of the contract, and obtained a decree for that purpose against B., from which an appeal was taken to the supreme court, and the decree affirmed, H. not having been a party to the suit. Held, that B., under the contract, was at liberty to select any 40-acre tract 'for the mill site, whether one of the forties he was to purchase or one of those from which he was to buy the timber.
2.
SAME-LIEN FOR MONEYS ADVANCED.
Where moneys were advanced upon the strength of a contract, and a subsequent conveyance was received to secure such advances, the party so making the advances is, under the circumstances of the case, justly and equitably entitled to a lien upon the mill forty as against the owners of the land, but not exceeding the sum mentioned in the contract. 8. SAME-PAROL MODIFICA'fIONS-NOT TO AFFECT EQUrTIEs.
Where a party had agreed to advance money upon the strength of a written contract, he becoming the third or outside party named in the contract, auy parol or other modification of the written contract unknown to him cannot affect his equities, whether made before or after the time he made the advance...
In Equity. J. S. Anderson and Vilas cf: Bryant, for complainant. Sloan, Stevens cf: Morris, for defendants. BUNN, D. J. This is a suit in equity brought to have a lien de·· elared and enforced against a certain 40 acres of land, and saw-mill situate thereon, lying in the county of St. Croix, in this state, described v.lO,no.9-54